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Abstract: Snouck Hurgronje, the advisor of Government of Netherland in Indonesia observed that 
Islam could be seen from two aspects: ritual and politic. “Give the full freedom to the Indonesian  
Muslims to conduct their religious doctrines related to the spiritual aspects, and do not give them 
the full freedom related the political aspects,” his suggestions at the time to the General Governor 
of Netherland to Indonesia. His view hence inspired the future leaders of Indonesia, Soekarno and 
Soeharto, particularly in the New Order under the President Soeharto. In the beginnings of his 
power he freed from the prisons the Masyumi figures, but did not permit to this Muslim organizations 
to rebirth; he forced all Islamic political parties to merger under one party, the PPP; he forced 
all political parties and mass organizations to use Pancasila as sole basic; he build hundreds of 
mosques every month; he supported the formation of ICMI (Association for Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals); he hesitated to capture and sent the prisons who criticized vocally all his policies, 
and this sad condition goes to continue till more than 30 years of his power. The time of big mutiny 
come to real condition following the all university students entire the archipelago came down to 
the streets and demanded  Soeharto to resign, or they forced him to come down, and finally the 
fall of his power happened in 1998 with the sad ending, and it is the logical consequence of his 
politicization of Islam.    
Keywords: Separation of religion and politic, depolization of Islam, HMI
Abstrak: Snouck Hurgronje, penasehat pemerintahan  Hindia  Belanda di Indonesia melihat Islam 
dari dua aspek: ritual dan politik. “Berilah kebebasan sepenuhnya kepada umat Islam Indonesia 
untuk mengamalkan ajaran-ajaran agamanya yang bersifat ritual, seperti salat, puasa, haji dan 
lain sebagainya. Tetapi jangan berikan kebebasan yang penuh kepada mereka dalam hal politik,” 
sarannya ketika itu. Pendapat ini rupanya menginspirasi presiden Soekarno dan Soeharto di masa 
berikutnya dalam memerintah rakyat Indonesia. Terutama di zaman Orba, ketika mulai berkuasa, 
Soeharto membebaskan tokoh-tokoh Masyumi dari penjara, tetapi tetap tidak mengizinkan parpol 
Masyumi berdiri lagi; menyederhanakan parpol yang beraliran Islam untuk bergabung di PPP; 
memberlakukan Asas Tunggal bagi semua parpol dan ormas;  membangun puluhan masjid setiap 
bulan; mendukung pendirian ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) untuk menghibur  umat 
Islam Indonesia, dan lain sebagainya. Namun krisis ekonomi dan  pengangguran semakin meningkat 
di setiap kota.  Bagi yang melakukan kritik akan ditangkap dan dipenjaran, dan keadaan ini terus 
berlangsung lebih  dari 30 tahun hingga banyak rakyat menderita, pada akhirnya melahirkan 
protes dan gelombang demonstrasi besar-besaran di seantero Nusantara, dan mengakibatkan 
kekuasaan Orba tumbang di tahun 1998. Kenyataan pahit ini merupakan akibat logis dari sistem 
pemerintahannya yang selalu melakukan politisasi terhadap Islam Indonesia.  
Katakunci: Pemisahan agama dan politik, depolitisasi Islam, HMI
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Introduction 
In the history of Indonesian politics, 
Christian Snouch Hurgronje, Soekarno and 
Soeharto have applied Ali Abdul Raziq’s 
notion. Even in the New Order Regime, 
President Soeharto handled the Islamic affair 
in the country based on the separation between 
religion and politics. The main reason of the 
two former Indonesian Presidents taking 
the decision was experience of the politics 
apparently weakened, the role of its religious 
and social dimensions has developed and 
flourished from time to time until today.1 
Like the view of former President Soekarno 
and secular nationalist group, HMI (Islamic 
Students Association) is of the view that Islam 
without political party became stronger. If the 
view of President Soeharto was predicated on 
political reasons, HMI’s view was based on 
religious motivation, namely to make Islam a 
religion that helped to unite the entire people 
in order to gain the national interest, and the 
desire of togetherness, although the religious 
view was definitely quite different to those of 
historical Muslim thought.2
The motto of creating ‘the intellectual-
ulama and the ulama-intellectual’ is the 
other factor which indicated the strong desire 
of HMI to live as devote Muslims amidst 
the Indonesian cultural milieu. The effort 
meant to prepare the leadership of the umma 
to enabled them to formulate the religious 
and social notions needed for development. 
The encouragement to put broader human 
concern into doctrines of Islam, and interpret 
Qur’ānic doctrine as social justice was indeed 
1 Victor Tanja, HMI: Sejarah & Kedudukannya 
di Tengah Gerakan-Gerakan Muslim Pembaharuan 
di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), 
142.
2 Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 159.
a useful contribution and appreciate to be 
taken up by HMI, not only for the religious 
development of the umma, but even to meet 
demands for justice and prosperity of all 
Indonesian people.
HMI has been adopted the concept of 
amal saleh (good deed) within the Qur’ān 
as their notion on the development of 
humankind. HMI’s stand like this was 
inspired by Fazlur Rahman’s suggestion to 
determine what is the best for the future of 
Islam and takes into consideration what is 
fundamental Islam, and what is historical 
Islam.3 The struggle for universal Islamic 
values, HMI as an organization of young 
Muslim intellectuals could accept for meeting 
the demands of modern Indonesian people 
without forcibly alienating it from the basic 
Islamic doctrines.  
That the above concept of HMI for 
development could be seen as relevance to 
the general development and has lasted in the 
country under the New order’s sponsorship. 
General Condition of Socio-Political Life 
The Indonesian development has shown 
a paradoxical implementation of models 
of the development between liberal model 
of Talcott Parson and conservative model 
of Huntington. In the Parsonian paradigm, 
development means change of social and 
economic structure and shift from a traditional 
system to a modern one that my result in 
social mobilization, development, while in the 
Huntington paradigm, becomes a combination 
of modernity and tradition with an effective 
government.4 
3 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (New York: Doubleday 
& Co., 1968), 310.
4 See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies (London: New Haven, 1968), 
80-3.
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The first paradox is that national deve-
lopment in Indonesia has, to some extent, 
adopted elements of a liberal development 
by the creation of modern forms of 
social and economic structures, yet in the 
meantime reviving classical indigenous 
traditions. The second paradox lay in the 
fact of economic liberalisation at the cost 
of strong political control.
Strong evidence of that kind of development 
is to be found in the two different directions 
of structural transformation that occurred 
in the economic field and the political one 
respectively. Structural transformation in the 
economy already seen in a shift of the income 
of society from agriculture sector in the agro 
industry, industry in profit sectors.
The change civic polities, on the other hand, 
indicated structural transformation in polity, 
by praetorians. According to Huntington, the 
civic polity is a type of politics in which one 
or more independent political forces dominate 
social forces, whereas praetorian power of a 
government is that which is not controlled by 
the political parties.5 The latter term might 
not fit in to Indonesian politics very well, 
but some elements of praetorianism were 
discernible in the New Order government, 
such as the absence of and independent 
effective political force, the strength of the 
bureaucracy in decision-making, and its 
expansion and interference into almost all 
social spheres.
In relation to the ‘ideology’ of development, 
a praetorianistic polity has, of course, a 
political logic of its own, such as an argument 
for the necessity of national stability for the 
success and sustainability of development 
5 R. William Liddle, “Soeharto’s Indonesia, 
Personal Rule and Political Institution” in Pacific 
Affairs, No. 58, 1985, 68-90.
itself. The accentuation of national stability 
has been one of the characteristics of the 
New Order’s political engineering. Political 
institutionalization in this respect is reflected 
in the security and monolithic approaches 
exercised by the New Order government. 
As a consequence, the degree of political 
participation has been weakened, particularly 
because political parties, as vehicles of 
political expression, were not able to articulate 
the political interest of the people.
The political institutionalization achieved 
thus has not encouraged people’s political 
participation, because the institutionalization 
process only strengthened what Professor 
Liddle has called the ‘New Order Pyramid.’6 
This  pyramid consist of a dominant 
presidency, which becomes the centre of 
decision-making, and pattern of state society 
relationship that combines co-option and 
response with repression.
According to Liddle, the mechanism of the 
New Order political structure departs from the 
presidency at the top giving commands to the 
military which is a most important element of 
the bureaucracy and, which in turn, exercises 
power over society. The whole process of 
political engineering has effectively created 
a relatively stable condition of relationship 
between state and society, or between the ruler 
and the ruled.
It is in such a political setting that the 
depoliticization of Islam has been processed. 
The manner of the process took the form 
of getting rid Islamic symbols for political 
activities, eliminating Islamic political parties, 
and clearing the political arena of Muslim 
politicians. The depoliticization of Islam has 
6 Nasir Tamara, “Islam Under the New Order: A. 
Political History,” in Prisma (English Edition), No. 
49, June, 1990, 14.
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reached its culmination in terms of political 
vehicle in the amalgamation of all existing 
Islamic political parties into PPP in 1973, and 
in terms of political ideology in the obligation 
to adopt Pancasila as the Asas Tunggal (the 
sole basis) by all political parties and mass 
organizations in 1985. 
The depoliticization of Islam was part of 
a broader target, namely the depoliticization 
of the people in general. This was seen in 
the creation of a floating mass population, 
which depoliticized people at the grass root 
level and alienated political leaders from their 
followers. The streamlining of political parties 
followed this in to Golkar, the PPP, and the 
PDI. Islamic political parties responded in a 
relativists ‘easy’ way toward this streamlining, 
though the story behind the creation of the PPP 
is not simple, as Nasir Tamara reported.
From the beginning, NU was the largest 
member. Although initially not very keen 
on merging, NU eventually joined without 
internal conflict. On the other hand, there was 
unrest within PSII resulting in a leadership 
change, which was won by pro-merger 
people. On the other hand, Parmusi and Perti 
supported a quick merger from the start.7 
This ‘easy and quick response’ was due 
in part to the situational logic of politics at 
the time that led political parties to follow 
the current of political engineering, and in 
part to an ‘intrinsic competition’ among 
Islamic political groups to be seen as the first 
supporter of the regime.
Escaping from the obligation not to 
include any mention of Islam in the new 
party’s name, Muslim leaders have chosen 
the term persatuan (unity) and pembangunan 
7 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intelectual 
Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1980), 78-116
(development.) They hoped by so doing not 
to delete some mention of Islam, because 
the term persatuan indicates one of the most 
important principles of Islam. They also 
hoped that the amalgamation would provide 
them with hikmah (in Indonesian language 
understood, interalia, in the sense of blessing 
in disguise.) To establish ukhuwwa Islāmiyya 
(Islamic brotherhood.) The adoption of 
the term pembangunan was perceived as 
agreement with and support for the New 
Order’s policy of development. It is possible 
that the use of the term’s persatuan and 
pembangunan was meant to convey a 
message that PPP, the Islamic party, had 
emerged to gain the support of the Muslim 
community in order to participate in the 
national development process.
It is notable that Muslims responses 
to the political change during the first 
ten years of the New Order (1996-1976) 
which, in relation to the agenda for the 
depoliticization of Islam, might be identified 
as a ‘period of conditioning’ appeared more 
political in nature, although with critical 
accommodation. Little intellectual response 
was shown, such as elaboration on the 
relationship between Islam and the state, the 
Pancasila, and politics with the exception 
of the accomodationalist responses of 
Mintaredja and Nurcholish Madjid.8 
Mintaredja (then the chairman of Parmusi 
and later President of PPP) in his reflection 
on Islam and the Pancasila considered that 
Islam does not aims at the creation of an 
Islamic state because during the time of the 
Prophet Muḥammad, the term ‘state’ in the 
sense of state as we knew it today was not 
8 H.M.S. Mintaredja, Renungan Pembaharuan 
Pemikiran: Masyarakat Islam dan Politik di Indonesia 
(Jakarta, 1971), 77.
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yet in existence.9 In Mintaredja’s view that 
the major duty of Muslims is to struggle for 
creating a true Muslim society which, should 
be distinguished from an Islamic state. A 
Muslim society could legitimately exist in 
a state without undermining its integrity as 
the nation-state.10 Concerning of relationship 
between Islam and politics, Mintaredja at the 
meantime believed in the totalistic character 
of Islam as a way of life, including political 
life. He maintains that the political issues are 
worldly in nature and as such an approach 
to political issues should be in accordance 
with is nature.
The slogan promoted by Nurcholish 
Madjid (than a national chairman of HMI) 
on the eve of the 1970’s “Islam-Yes, Islamic 
party-No” is similar in nature. The idea is 
one of the main points of this ‘his renewal 
project’ which as severely criticised by many 
Muslims.11 Having observed the problems of 
Indonesian Islam, which lay in the paradox 
between the defeat of politicised Islam and 
the rapid expansion of it, Madjid came to the 
conclusion that Islam’s quantitative growth 
was not encouraged by the Islamic parties or 
Islam organizations, for the Islamic parties 
had failed to build a positive and sympathetic 
image of Islam.12
According to H. Munawir Sjadzali, 
in certain circumstances, the absence of 
the Islamic political parties was better for 
9 H.M.S. Mintaredja, Renungan Pembaharuan 
Pemikiran, 78.
10 For more detailed in this account, see Nurcholish 
Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam 
dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat,” 1-12.
11 Nurcholish Madjid, “Keharusan Pembaharuan 
Pemikiran Islam,” 1-12.
12 H. Munawir Sjadzali, Muslim’s Interests are 
Better Served in the Absence of Muslim Parties: 
Indonesian Experience (Jakarta: Departemen of 
Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1992), 2.
Muslims. The experiences of national life in 
the past view years clearly showed that the 
Muslim umma’s interests were even served at 
the time when there was no Muslim party in 
the Indonesian political sphere, he said.13
From the start of the New Order, especially 
in the last decade, many expectations of 
Muslim for the improvement and religious 
infrastructure and facilities have been 
sufficiently met. In the past, at the time when 
Muslim parties were presents, the same 
expectations had never been fulfilled. The 
following examples could be advanced.
In the field of law, for instance, with the 
passing of law No. 14 of 1970’s  on judicial 
Authority the existence of Religious Court of 
Law (read: Islamic Court) is fully recognized 
as an independent court of law and equal to 
the other three Courts of law: Public Court, 
Administrative Court, and Military Court. 
This law was then followed by the enactment 
of law No. 7 of 1989 on Religious Court, 
some of which had prevailed for more than 
100 years, and at the same time served as the 
realization of the stipulation contained in law 
No. 14 of 1970 on the independence of the 
Religious Court, to the other three law.
In this context, it should be noted that in 
1948, a Muslim party brought up a proposal 
for the improvement of religious court status 
to KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, 
Indonesian National Central Committee) 
which, at the time, served as provisional 
parliament, but the proposal met with strong 
opposition from other parties or factions 
and, being a minority group at the time, that 
Muslim party could do nothing about it.14
13 H. Munawir Sjadzali, Muslim’s Interests, 3
14 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil 
Society: ICMI and the Strategy for the Indonesian 
Middle Class,” Indonesia Paper, October, 1993, 11.
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Till in the development in the field of 
law, up to the year 1991, religious judges 
had no standardized books of law similar to 
the KUHP (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum 
Pidana, Penal Code) for judges in the Public 
Court, in spite of the fact that the Religious 
Court had been established long before; the 
religious judges had to resort to numerous yet 
diverse reference fiqh books in dealing with 
the legal issues brought up by members of the 
community. As a result, if often happened that 
the two similar cases, headed by two different 
judges with two different books of reference, 
would result in two different verdicts, which 
meant that there was no legal.
The peculiar situation ended, once again, 
at the time of the New Order, in the absence 
of Muslim parties, with the issuance of a 
joint-decree of the President of the Supreme 
Court and the Minister of Religious Affairs 
on the establishment of an Islamic Law 
Compilation Project.
In December 1987, the project succeeded in 
completing three draft books of legal references 
to be used by the religious judges throughout 
Indonesia: book marriage, Inheritance, and 
waqf (religious endowment.) By the presidential 
instruction No. 1 of 1991, issues on June 10, 
1991 just one week before the President and 
his family made a pilgrim to Mecca, those three 
books were officially sanctioned and ordered 
to be publicly used.
In the field of education. The Indonesian 
people has law No. 2 of 1989 on National 
Education System,  in which religious 
education is affirmed to be a sub-system to 
the National Education System, and religious 
instruction is compulsory at all public schools 
and universities. The law also reaffirmed 
recognition to the long existing religious 
education institutions in conformity with the 
claim of the New Order that the state which, 
is based on Pancasila is neither a theocratic 
nor a secular state.
In the relation to houses of worship there 
has been a sharp increase in the number of 
mosques and muṣallās including over 500 
strong and beautiful mosques built by the 
Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila 
(Muslim Charity Foundation) chaired by the 
President Soeharto.
In the realm of dakwah (Islamic propa-
gation), it is well known that the major 
weakness of socio-Islamic organizations 
is a serious lack of financial back up. An 
international Islamic organization once 
promised to help the financing of 1000 
preachers for the whole country. However, 
the realization was only for 300 preachers, 
far below the target, and later the number 
went down to just a little more than 100. To 
cope with that unfavourable situation and 
being fully aware of the urgency for religious 
guidance in the remote and isolated areas 
especially in the transmigration locations 
President Soeharto urged MUI (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of 
Ulama) to prepare 1000 da‘i (preachers) for 
religious duties in transmigration sites. They 
would receive Rp.100.000 per month for the 
period of three years as financial support from 
the Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila. 
The same foundation has also donated 
financial support for other 1000 imams for 
transmigration sites channelled through 
MDI (Majelis Dakwah Islamiah, Council for 
Islamic Preaching.) 
During the Old Order regime under 
President Soekarno and still more so under the 
New Order regime of his successor Soeharto, 
the Indonesian government was directly 
or indirectly involved in the construction 
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of many mosques and the development 
of public institutions of Islamic religious 
education, from the primary school to the 
IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State 
Islamic University.)15
The New Order regime, on the other 
hand, has started for the depoliticization of 
Islam which, was primarily materialized by 
a ban on political parties based exclusively 
on Islam or its particularities; it favoured the 
development of Islamic values in the social, 
cultural and intellectual spheres of life, in 
order to create the so-called ‘ethical’ basis of 
national development.
Up to present time, Islam often functions 
as a source of motivation for demands of 
adjustment of different aspects of government 
policy. In the demands, the Islamic motive is 
generally combined with other reasons and 
motives, of a cultural, social, economic or 
political nature. An example is the movement 
for the democratization of the political system 
which has been growing for some years now. 
Its background is partly based on Islamic 
values, legal notions and organization.
The Islamic element was still more 
prominent in the recent campaign for the 
abolition of SDSB (Sumbangan Dermawan 
Sosial Berhadiah, Social Philanthropically 
Contribution with Prizes) lottery, in which 
formal arguments about Islamic law were 
combined with the denunciation of growing 
social and economic disparities. The latter 
campaign finally attained its goal on November 
25, 1993, when minister of social Affairs 
announced the discontinuation of the lottery. 
However, at present Islam is seldom a source 
of criticism of the political system or the 
public authorities as a whole in the country.
15 Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI 
pada Dies Natalis ke 51, February 5, 1998, Depok, 7.
HMI observed that  the  view of 
Munawir Sjadzali is true in certain aspects 
of development; but in the other it was 
insufficient, particularly, in order to develop 
a democratic political system. HMI is of 
the view that the time has come when the 
need of political reform has become urgent. 
It is an interpretation of commitment and 
responsibility of HMI as child of the nation 
as well as an intellectual community. 
According to Anas Urbaningrum,16 the 
national chairman of HMI in 1995-1997, the 
reform concerning the main bases of having 
a society, nation and state should be radical, 
fundamental and systematic. The main agenda 
of the Indonesian nation in the years to come 
is to develop steady and matured social 
system and structure based on appropriate 
foundations. The strong and matured system 
able to anticipate needs in each sphere and 
demands of smooth social change without 
much turbulence.
HMI is of view that the promise of the 
New Order government to broaden Pancasila 
democracy in practical politics is only lip 
service. The organization considered that 
political democracy could not be built by 
political slogan only; it is possible only by way 
of creating healthy and qualified interaction 
among all political forces. This need a strong 
state with an effective government and a 
strong society with autonomy of people whit 
character. The effective administration could 
safeguard the social order and run the public 
service, while the antonymous people who 
have character would guarantee the growth 
of critical participants and emancipators of 
culture.17 
16 Graha Insan Cita, Pidato Ketua Umum PB 
HMI, 8.
17 Republika, September, 1993
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The democratic tradition that can accord 
respect to diversity should be tough at 
practical level. The politics of concentration 
of power and the policy of incorporation in 
operation since long should be reviewed. 
Indeed, the politics of concentration is not 
only not relevant to the democratic tradition, 
but is also contrary to the heterogeneous social 
nature of the Indonesian people. The motto 
Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity In Diversity) is 
a cultural treasure of the Indonesian people 
which quite relevance to be practiced in real 
practical life. The selection of public service 
officials should represent and respect this 
pluralistic society. 
The strong demand for democracy and 
healthy political activity have forced the 
government to review political life, together 
with the legislative institutions to review the 
rules of political game. From time to time 
the people awareness towards their rights as 
citizens has increased, including right to politics 
and implementation of the clean government 
by the New Order administration.
While speaking in the student study Forum 
of HMI in September, 1993, chief of socio-
political staff of ABRI, Lt. General Hariyoto 
P.S remarked that the ABRI’s interest in the 
established political system in Indonesia is 
for the cause of national stability. In stable 
political system, all kinds of people’s demand 
could be accommodated properly.18
According to him, stability is always 
to be associated with public pressure and 
demand should be implemented with 
security approach. He recognized the 
worried of many if the demands are not 
accommodated properly it would invite 
mass frustration in people, and aggressive 
18 Republika, September, 1993
action by authority,19 and in turn, would lead 
to socio-political unrest.
The New Order and Indonesian Islam
In the last years of Soeharto administration, 
the political dynamism in the country has 
increased. After short period of decline 
following the repression of Megawati20 
supporter on 27 July 1996, a surge of 
democratic waves appeared throughout the 
Archipelago. Reminiscent of the last days of 
Soekarno, the current democracy movements 
has been championed by the university student 
who launched their protest in response to the 
government which is seen as being incapable 
of controlling the crisis and its negative 
impacts on the life of the people.
The politics off de-politicization of 
Soeharto consists of two strategies; the direct 
and indirect one. The first has been target to 
the rural masses, which constitute bulk of 
In Indonesian population (approximately 70 
percent.) It has taken  the form of the so-called 
‘floating mass’ policy, the purpose of which 
is to limit the activities of political parties 
as far as the district level. The underlying 
assumption of the particular policy is to 
protect people from political manipulation by 
competing parties, which had occurred in the 
past and engendered political instability and 
promoted social disturbance.
The second strategy, namely the indirect 
strategy of de-politicization has been imple-
mented through various mechanisms, most 
19 Megawati Soekarno Putri is daughter of former 
Indonesia first President, Soekarno. She is also national 
chairwomen of the PDI Perjuangan, and known as a 
prominent opposition leader of the country along with 
Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid.
20 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik (Jakarta: LASPI/Lembaga Studi Pembangunan 
Indonesia, 1977), 132.
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important of which have been the state’s 
corporatization, co-optation, and ideological 
hegemony. Through the corporatist mechanism, 
the state is able to exert systematic control and 
surveillance over the existing interest groups 
in society through direct intervention in their 
existing organizations.
According to the Lt. General (ret.) Rudini,21 
the rise of the people political awareness 
should be accompanied also with the rise of the 
government’s role and socio-political structure. 
It was quite important in order to meet the 
development demands, their aspirations and 
aggregation of people’s political interest could 
be developed to become ‘affirmation potential’ 
for sustained  national  development,   not 
just ‘trouble-maker potential’ which hampers 
national integration.
Accordingly, the role of the ABRI, 
the political parties, the Golkar and all the 
existing mass organization, including youth 
organizations, should be enhanced maximally 
so that they could participate to increase the 
national awareness and to boost national 
unity in order to realize the national ideals 
based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. 
As custodians of people’s aspirations all 
political parties and Golkar were expected 
to participate actively in enhancing of the 
quality of development and democracy. In this 
connection, the role of political institutions 
should be maximized.
All socio-political forces in the country 
should work to prepare the people qualified 
for development and capable of channelling 
the socio-political aspirations of the grass-root 
people; they are expected to serve the interest 
of the society, the nation and the state properly 
and consistently. Unfortunately, these political 
21 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 132-3.
parties, particularly the Golkar as ruling party 
was regarded as a political vehicle by its 
leaders for their self-interest, their families 
and their cronies.
The role of mass organizations as medium 
to articulate the people’s interest should be 
advocated and supported continuously. 
The rise of all social institutions, including 
youth organizations is quite helpful to 
enhance the quality of political awareness 
in support of national unity and integration 
for better civilized Indonesian people in 
the future.22
There are three Islamic university 
student organizations, namely HMI (Islamic 
Student Association), PMII (Islamic Student 
Movement), and IMM (Muhammadiyah 
Student Union), and each of them  has 
had  a  form  of  cadre programme through 
training, usually it was range of training 
since primary level, mediums and advanced. 
Only HMI declared itself an independent 
organization. The other two: PMII and IMM, 
have been affiliated to the large Islamic 
religious organizations namely NU and 
Muhammadiyah.
The basis of membership of HMI is quite 
unique. The largest section of HMI membership 
is in the secular universities and colleges. On 
the contrary, most of PMII membership is 
from Islamic religious colleges, particularly 
from IAINs through the country and higher 
education institutions run by the private 
foundations, while those of IMM originated 
from Muhammadiyah higher education 
institutions, for instance, Muhammadiyah 
universities and IKIP (Institute for Teachers 
and educators) Muhammadiyah.
22 PB HMI, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman 
(Jakarta: PB HMI), 136.
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As most of its members are from general 
universities, so in cadre formation, HMI 
would try to provide sufficient Islamic 
knowledge for them. While those of them 
studying at IAINs has been provided a 
general knowledge in order to bring them 
at par with their counterpart in the secular 
colleges and universities. This programme 
has been formulated on the beautiful motto 
i.e to create ‘the intellectual-ulama and the 
ulama-intellectual.’
The above motto has been programmed 
since the birth of HMI in 1947. Its main 
objective is to fill the vaccum of Muslim 
young intellectual circle, as ever has been 
done by the Jong Islamiten Bond (JIB) in 
Dutch colonial era. The JIB born on January 
1, 1925 was dissolved as Japan came and 
annexed Indonesia. Therefore, in those 
circumstances, the establishment of HMI was 
inspired by notion of the JIB with its ‘Islamic 
study club.’ Hence, in several things, HMI 
focused its concern on long-term purpose 
of the JIB, namely it would like to convince 
the Muslim young intellectual to complete 
their academic education, they should also 
understand Islam.
The formulation was a response to 
the prevailing challenge faced by Muslim 
university students in the secular universities 
and colleges. Deliar Noer, ex-national 
chairman of HMI, observed that the Muslim 
young intellectuals were keep away the 
Islamic doctrine by the secular educational 
system. According to him, such a problem 
had been faced by the JIB and still remained 
before HMI.23
Because secular education which was 
neutral towards the religious notion, they 
23 PB HMI, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman, 
137.
became alienated spaced from Islam. They 
tended to ignore the Islamic doctrine and 
sharī‘a. More than that the secular educational 
system created friction among the Muslim 
youth between those who ignored and those 
who obeyed the Islamic doctrine. Above 
all, because in Java island could be found 
the tendency of religious assimilation, their 
presence in the secular education affected to 
deeper friction between intermingle Muslim 
group and those who desired to purify the 
sharī‘a from all kind of derivations.
In order to over come the above problems, 
Deliar Noer has given inspiration to develop 
nationalism based of the deepest religious 
heritage. He believes that a nation which has 
identification with the religion of its majority 
population is a basic key for national unity 
and integration. Therefore, the Indonesian 
strength lay in its identification with Islam, 
and only Muslim which hardly endeavoured 
to develop the Islamic basis of nation 
potential become ‘the ulama-intellectual and 
the intellectual-ulama.’24
The noble desire, which likely underlined 
HMI programmes and activities, which 
implemented through series of leadership 
training, has been going on until today. In 
each period of chairmanship, such activities 
tended to become conventional. The platform 
of the organization almost never changed from 
year to year, particularly in branch levels, 
which later occurred routinely and even 
obstinately.
According to Sudirman Tebba,25 ex-activist 
of Ciputat branch of HMI, the programme of 
HMI is to achieve the objective of ideal man 
24 PB HMI, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman, 
137.
25 PB HMI, HMI Menjawab Tantangan Zaman, 
147.
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as stated by the government through the 
improvement measure of religious education 
in secular universities and syllabus of the 
IAINs throughout the country. Although its 
formulation was different from the HMI’s 
platform, yet as stipulated by the 1983 
GBHN (the Guidelines of State Policy) that 
the objective of national education is the 
enhancement of faith and devotion to the 
One and Only God, of intelligence and skill, 
of character, and of personality and spirit of 
nationhood and love of homeland.
The above formulation placed the 
enhancement of faith and devotion to the 
one only God as the top priority in the 
national education objective. It was indicated 
that religious education in secular higher 
education should get the man concern. 
One fact of the seriousness is the ongoing 
perfection of the Islamic religious subjects 
in the secular higher education.
After long time the religious subject was 
given in the conventional way, and today in 
the secular universities, the Islamic concept 
of any discipline was already taught. This 
indication is one step ahead with relating 
the process of science and technology to 
Islamization. Besides, it has developed many 
ways to delve deep into Islamic doctrine in 
various fields like in economics, politics, 
culture etc.
One the other side, the New Order adminis-
tration policies generally weakened all Islamic 
university student organizations. Since its 
established, the New Order government engaged 
in bringing about economic development and 
repressing all political opponents and mass and 
religious organizations. This phenomenon is 
peculiar of neo-fascists, not only in Indonesia, 
but it was also common to several third world 
countries like Brazil, Argentina and Iran under 
Shah Reza Pahlevi.26  
Although the real political condition was 
non-conducive for all-political parties and 
mass organization activists, HMI remained 
to serve for the benefits of umma. Under 
the real and reasonable approach, according 
to Adi Sasono,27 the cadres of HMI whether 
in infra or in suprastructure have made an 
endless contribution, throughout in the time 
when the Indonesian people were struggling to 
defend the State against the colonial effort to 
reoccupy, or in the period of national character 
building, and at the time of consolidating the 
freedom. Because HMI and KAMI activists 
were also thinkers in the development sectors, 
the contribution is quite valuable. And up to 
today, HMI is the largest organization in the 
campuses of the country.
Each cadre of HMI is expected to be 
doing something of benefit for the umma 
wherever they lived and worked. The cadre 
outside government structure became writer, 
columnist, analyst and critic. Their actions 
are as pure activists functional outside the 
system, and have a function to remember 
and put forwarded a healthy norm for 
national life. This group is usually called 
‘pressure group.’28
Meanwhile, there is also a group who 
entered the system. This group called insti-
tutionalist, which struggled from within 
the structure. Some of them succeeded in 
supporting the processes of change from 
26 Adi Sasono is ex-activist of Bandung branch 
HMI. Since May 1998 President B. J. Habibie 
appointed him as minister economic, co-operative and 
weak entrepreneurship development.
27 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 155.
28  H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 156.
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within the structure. However there was a 
group disinclined to motivating the change 
process from within. Beside that, there was 
professionalist group which was neutral 
towards power system. They tended to work 
related to the justice aspect, even distribution 
and freedom. They have given contribution, 
but their activities have not influenced to the 
wider social issues. They worked sectorally 
in their own field.
Therefore, a novel idea was needed to 
resume their activities and responsibilities 
based on professionalism. They did not need 
to do dichotomy between those worked in the 
state institutions and outside of it. But, they 
should develop togetherness in order to realize 
the sovereignty of the nation effectively. 
As the ideal cadres of HMI, they did not 
get trapped in seminar activity and regarded 
at as escape from problems faced by the 
Indonesian society. Also if they worked in 
government offices, not automatically the 
ideal job as HMI’s cadre will be over? They 
needed to be aware that the social change 
process toward the right direction is quite 
complicated process requiring collaboration 
with the other side or institutions, which 
existed in the government institution as well 
as outside of it. They needed to focus on 
the mass approach and practical action and 
more attention to the professionalism in their 
own field. It was a development of political 
education agenda.29
Democracy is a social process and also 
a learning one. The social control towards 
the decision-making which quite often not 
inclined to justice was also time-consuming. 
To implement democracy shortcuts and 
romantic measures are not enough. The idea 
29 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 154.
of revolution which is quite often talked in 
certain circle, particularly the radical young 
generation, did not offer the way-out of the 
umma problems, because the problems were 
very complicated and needed to discern 
the importance off all socials forces to 
operationalize collective awareness.
In this connection, could be seen the role 
off intellectual organizations like KAHMI, 
ICMI or the other, to develop a positive inter-
action. In order to struggle for justice and 
even distribution which did not end with lip-
service. Slogan and philanthropy programmes 
inclined to defend status-quo. Theoretically, 
there is no difference between philanthropy 
programmes and even distribution one. The 
gift of philanthropy programmes is to provide 
a social agenda, but it did not have impact of 
concrete economic structure. What has been 
expected by the society is even distribution 
programmes and has the impact on the 
productive asset of entrepreneurship.30   
It is hard to imagine that without support 
of KAHMI, ICMI could play a significant 
role and become the prestigious organization 
that it is today. Vast majority of ICMI is 
also members of KAHMI. The main job of 
HMI’s alumnus is to become catalyst of the 
development for empowerment of the people. 
This job covered agendas of rapid reform in 
social, economic and political renewal in the 
society. The economic and political democracy 
is a necessity, and KAHMI has a role to guide 
and push up the political process within the 
framework of Pancasila democracy.31 It is 
no exaggeration to say that the success of 
all programmes of ICMI in economic and 
30 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 157.
31 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik,  157.
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socio-political fields in the country is caused 
by KAHMI’s support as one of the factors, 
“because both in the centre (Jakarta), and in 
the districts, the majority members of ICMI 
are members of KAHMI too.32
While receiving PB HMI on August 13, 
1993, vice President Try Sutrisno said that 
the globalization era demanded the quite 
tight competition, more advanced society and 
openness of action. As the natural resource 
decreased from time and all sectors needed 
better management.33 In order to response 
the suggestions, the national chairman of 
HMI, Yahya Zaini agreed to the call of vice 
President, and stressed the importance of 
better political education. According to him, 
in the frame of political education, HMI 
wanted that the following issues must be 
included namely Pancasila as an ideological 
foundation, nationhood outlook and religious 
outlook. Yayha Zaini remarked that essence 
of nationalist outlook is the unity and the 
integration as a motivator, mover and cement 
in every struggle of the Indonesian people.34 
Regarding the economic crisis, HMI 
through its national chairman, Anas 
Urbaningrum35 has expressed its apprehension. 
According to him, the monetary crisis of the 
country has given us the most important 
lessons and it has a bitter impact on the 
grass-root level people. The lessons were: 
First that the innate strength of economic 
globalization. The foreign debt should be 
utilized for the maximum benefit of people 
and their prosperity. Second that a tiny group 
of society could not develop the strength 
32 Pidato Ketua Umum PB HMI pada Dies Natalis 
ke 51, 15.
33 Kompas, August 14, 1993
34 Kompas, August 14,  1993
35 “International Socialism,” A Quarterly Journal 
of Socialist Theory, Autumn 1998, 11.
of economic foundation. Strength of the 
tiny group caused the collapse of national 
economy and disrupt distribution.
At the practical level, the above constructive 
suggestions were not implemented by 
the government so that the apprehensions 
appeared and raised a huge social unrest and 
deep economic crisis in the country.
The deepening economic crisis was being 
matched by a growing political crisis Soeharto 
was facing a people who had slowly and 
painfully begun to recover from the terrible 
defeat of 1965. The first major sign of the 
revival of resistance came in 1974 when a 
million people spilled onto the streets during 
widespread student protests. Yet they were 
also brought together as workers, and as the 
1980s progressed they began to use their 
collective strength to strike for better wages 
and working conditions with some success.36 
By 1996 the dissatisfaction against the 
Soeharto regime was spreading up to sections 
of the ruling and middle classes, who were 
being excluded from the profit and corruption 
bonanza by Soeharto’s cronies. Protests at 
various levels were mounting throughout to 
come. The idea behind creating of ICMI is 
not revealed instantly, but it has historically 
a deep root in the last 30 years.
In the beginning of 1960’s, some of santri 
alumni entered the universities and colleges. 
Seven years later, the boom of educated 
scholars from the santri cultural background 
occurred. After graduation, they became 
bureaucrats. During developing their career, 
for few years, they hid their Islamhood and 
after they occupied an important position, 
they begun to act foe ‘Islamization’ of offices, 
departments, or campuses. The managers and 
the leaders of the office held pengajian or 
36 See footnote No. 41. 
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teaching of Islamic doctrines and performed 
congregation prayers in the place where they 
worked. And lecturers revived the religious 
activities in the campus.37
The former HMI activists occupied the 
important positions in the governance, for 
example, Arifin Siregar, Hasyirul Harahap, 
Abdul Ghofur, Azwar Anas, Akbare Tanjung, 
Mari’e Muhammad and so on. The number 
of educated Muslims has increased. They 
needed a container to channel their aspiration. 
They have an intention to play wider role in 
contributing to the development process. The 
role could be effective if they joined hand 
with the bureaucrats in decision-making. In 
the bureaucrats should be attracted to join 
the intellectuals outside bureaucracy, or non-
bureaucrat-intellectuals should be called for 
merging with the bureaucracy.38
The birth of ICMI was expected to 
determine Indonesian Muslim history in the 
year to come. Gradually, to fulfil the aspiration 
of umma to colour the decision-making, ICMI 
would like to become a platform to collect 
the ideas of Muslim intellectuals. ICMI is 
a non-political movement, although it was 
bound to Islamic commitment, ICMI was not 
intended to revive primordialism, because it 
thought I terms of entire Indonesian people. In 
Azyumardi Azra’s words, ICMI will become 
‘brain-trust’ of the New Order government in 
the years to come.39
According to Ridwan Saidi, ex-national 
chairman of HMI in 1974-1976 the birth 
of ICMI was an inseparable part of the 
will Muslim scholars for vertical mobility. 
37 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Islam Aktual, Refleksi-
Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim, cet. IX 
(Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 101.
38 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Islam Aktual, Refleksi-
Sosial Seorang Cendekiawan Muslim, 101.
39 Berita Buana, December 7, 1990.
Because in the early of 1960s, there were 
thousands of Muslim scholars and they did 
not enter party was not likely to recruit a 
Muslim intellectual in top position. Second, 
the intellectuals felt that their views were 
not at home with the existing Islamic parties, 
because their social origin did not have roots 
in prevailing Islamic parties.40
In order to resolve the deadlock, they 
constituted Persami (Indonesian Muslim 
Scholar Union) in 1964. While the New Order 
came into being, some of Muslim scholars 
headed by Subchan, Z.E, from NU element 
withdraw from Persami, and established ISII 
(Ikatan Sarjana Islam Indonesia, Indonesian 
Muslim Scholar association) affiliated to NU 
party. Unfortunately the two Muslim scholars 
associations never displayed their activities 
so that even many Muslim scholars did not 
know them.
When Parmusi emerged on surface, a lot 
at Muslim scholars  put their hope on it. Some 
of them joined the Sekber Golkar. Through 
Golkar and Parmusi, Muslim intellectuals 
channelled their vertical mobility. In the 1970 
the government restructured political parties 
and organizations on a large scale. The Islamic 
political parties were merged in one party. 
Islamic mass organizations were separated 
from political organization, and engaged 
in social activities. In the year 1985, the 
political renewal and consolidation reached 
its culmination with the enforcement of Asas 
Tunggal Pancasila. Since then, legally there 
was not any other Islamic party. And then the 
years after in 1990 established ICMI that was 
supported by the New Order government as 
a viable alternative to channel their socio-
political activities. The vast majority of umma 
initially welcomed it with respect.
40 Kompas, December 8, 1990.
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In general, there were different approaches 
the Muslim leaders to the modern-challenges: 
legal, cultural, and social transformation. 
Legalistic approach aimed at revamping the 
existing order and society under the blur-
print of Islamic legal, ritual and formalistic 
precept. Islamic doctrine and laws to became 
the sole arbiter and standard of reference in 
all practices and affairs in the society.
The cultural approach is aimed at distilling 
methods from Islamic teachings, which are 
capable of integrating non-religious sphere 
(secularist part) into a new totality of Islamic 
framework of development.41 The idea of 
ICMI that efforts for modernity are efforts 
to develop parallel institutions (banking, 
scientific enterprises, economic, politics, etc.) 
under Islamic teaching.
The transformation approach aimed at 
seeking solutions to the problems of modernity 
by avoiding exclusivist attitude both towards 
neo-orthodox and non-Islamic aspirations. 
It advocated accommodative attitude and 
introduced disturbing questions related to the 
central doctrine of orthodoxy. Therefore the 
leading advocates of ICMI like H.M Soeharto 
and Prof. Dr. B.J Habibie would like to mould 
ICMI on the ideology of Pancasila, close to 
Indonesian culture, ‘Modern-Muslim,’ and 
high quality Muslim.
The leading Indonesian Musl im 
intellectuals like Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie,42 Dr. 
Nurcholish Madjid, Dr. Amien Rais, Prof.
Dr. Quraish Shihab, Prof. Dr. Imaduddin, 
Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Abdurrahman Wahid 
and others have pursued this transformative 
41 John Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia: The Eight Asia 
Megtrends thar Are Changing the World (London, 
1996), 103-240.
42 See “Otokritik Tahun Keempat Silaturrahmi 
ICMI,” Gatra, No. 9 Tahun I, Jakarta, January 14, 
1995, 36.
strategy, advocating non-confrontational 
understanding of Islam and modernity, seeking 
open dialogue with other groups for reaching 
mutual understanding of problems faced by 
society in general, and encouraging the umma 
to work together with others in resolving 
such pressing questions as massive poverty, 
abuses of human rights,43 the stagnation of 
democratization, etc.
There are several reasons for HMI and 
KAHMI to support the birth of ICMI; in 
various point they have same platforms 
and purpose to uplift of the umma’s fate 
toward better life educationally, culturally, 
economically, socially and politically. More 
important than theses that one of the basic 
purposes of the ICMI is to call Indonesian 
people, particularly the umma for the de-
militarization of Indonesian politic; to seek 
democratization; and to create a system of 
‘proportionalization’ in which Muslim are 
represented in the cabinet, MPR and DPR, 
and so on in accordance with their percentage 
of the general populations.
Although ICMI is not a political 
organization, its basic purpose and objective 
has political impact. Prof.Dr. B.J Habibie, the 
general chairman of ICMI, firmly rejected the 
notion that ICMI is a political organization, 
and insisted it did not belong to any political 
group. It was established only to fight 
ignorance and poverty among Muslims.44
In line with B.J Habibie’s statement, 
Soetjipto Wirosardjono and Nurcholish 
Madjid rejected the thinking of those activists 
of ICMI whom employed Islamic symbols for 
political purpose; including democratization 
43 E. Ramage Douglas, Politics in Indonesian, 
Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London, 1995), 36.
44 Merdeka, December 8, 1992 and Merdeka, 
November 30, 1992
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and de-militarization, especially when they 
did not understand the meaning of religious 
symbol they manipulated.45 On the other 
side, Aswab Mahasin as a ‘non-active’ 
member of ICMI has expressed his worry 
that ICMI has become a pseudo-political 
party and behaves like a political machine.46 
For the same reason Nurcholish Madjid and 
Amien Rais had withdrawn their support 
from the organization in the years after its 
establishment, because they observed that the 
ICMI was too political.
Many in ICMI seek proportionalisation or 
the distribution of appointments to the senior 
bureaucracy or in the DPR/MPR in proportion 
to the religious makeup of the population at 
large. That is, Muslims should hold nearly 
90 percent of seats in parliament and cabinet 
positions. Apparently after information of the 
ICMI, the umma has been represented in the 
cabinet and parliament. Even 200 members 
of HMI alumnus became MPR and 9 of them 
became minister.47
Adi Sasono argued that they ‘key issues’ 
for ICMI are democratization and an eventual 
reduction in the military’s political role. The 
problem with ABRI, he noted, is that it was 
worried about any challenge to its position.48 
Hence, it was understandable that ABRI 
expressed its displeasure over the birth of 
ICMI. Democratization is not the primary goal 
of many in ICMI, because the main objective 
of its activities to “empower the state in 
order to Islamize society and enact Islamic 
value based on law and regulations.” Mohtar 
Mas’oed political scientist at Gajah Mada 
45 E. Ramage Douglas, Politics in Indonesian, 
95.
46 Politics in Indonesian, 94.
47 Republika, February 5, 1998
48 E. Ramage Douglas, Politics in Indonesian, 
96-7.
University argues that Abdulrahmman and 
NU on the other hand “seek  to empower the 
people” and in so doing both Muslim, and non 
Muslim Indonesian will be empowered.49 
How have the umma and Indonesian 
people responded to HMI? Of course it 
could not be ignored since the organization 
has from its inception expressed its basic 
commitment toward the umma and the nation. 
The formulation of objectives HMI at the time 
of its establishment was obviously revealed 
in its commitment towards the nation and the 
Islamic religion, namely:
1. Defending the Indonesia Republic, 
State and enhanced the dignity of 
Indonesian people.
2. Enforcing and spreading Islamic 
religious doctrine.
In the congress of HMI held on 1947, the 
above two objectives were spelt-out in the 
platform as below:     
1. Collaboration with Indonesian people 
in general and the armed forces in 
particular in defending the Indonesia 
Republic and State.
2. Collaboration with organizations 
and Islamic political parties particu-
larly, and those of other parties in 
general in order to improve poli tical 
and economic life of Indonesian 
people in general and of the umma 
in particular.50
As a logical consequence of HMI 
commitment toward the nationhood, the 
organization was expected to work together 
hand with the other organizations and 
institutions. The Islamic youth organization 
should have a cooperative attitude, toward 
49 Politics in Indonesian, 110-1.
50 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 215.
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the fellow Islamic organization like PMII and 
IMM, as well as the non Islamic ones like 
Catholic Students Organization, Protestant-
Christian Organization and from other 
religious backgrounds. HMI collaboration 
with other such organizations could be seen in 
the Kelompok  Cipayung (Cipayung Group.) 
It consists of PMII,GMNI,GMKI,PMKRI and 
Indonesian people in various aspects. They 
used the medium to strengthen articulation 
of strategic issue of whole life which arose 
amidst the society. Beside that the motivation 
of unity in the Kelompok Cipayung is 
based on the awareness of better future for 
Indonesia appropriate to the noble aspiration of 
Independence. Initially Kelompok Cipayung 
has played the role of challenging that, 
aspiration, social controller and agent of 
development. Unfortunately, in the years 
following its formation, the role has been 
decreasing following the internal and external 
problems. One of the external problems came 
from the government which controlled strictly 
all activities of the organizations and thereby 
emasculated all political parties. In other 
words an account of internal and external 
conditions, Kelompok Cipayung creativity 
could not develop.
HMI could play its role maximally 
as agent of the umma aspirations if it had 
at least three things: first, independent 
position and attitude so that there is no 
over-intervention from outside to curb its 
freedom and creativity. To attain this was 
easy because a lot of its alumnus occupied 
strategic positions, particularly in governance, 
and influenced NGOs. Second, it should have 
qualified human resource in various skills. The 
quality of HMI’s personnel is quite decisive 
in this regard. Third, the external conditions 
was favourable. It meant that all programmes 
of HMI could not work properly unless the 
external condition is good.51
In another word, it was obvious that the 
government needed Islam when it supported 
the government and gave it legitimacy. Once 
the government supported establishment of 
Parmusi, for instance, aimed at countering the 
force of PNI. On the contrary, the government 
hampered all activity regarded as competitor 
with the government power; for instance, 
the proposal of Mohammad Hatta, former 
vice President, to establish PDII (Partai 
Demokrasi Islam Indonesia) was not okayed 
by the government.
Even the creation Parmusi, according 
to Samson, did not benefit even the Muslim 
modern group in Indonesia. One of the 
weakness of the party was its failure to get 
recognition as a legal and influential political 
forces, namely possess political power in 
proportion to the number of its followers.52 
The several repressive policies had negative 
impact for future of Islam, it was more 
obvious in 1980’s. According to Vatikiotis,53 
the government succeed in destroying Islamic 
parties, with the religious politics of the New 
Order which emphasized harmony, Muslim 
community felt it was political chaos. The 
Islamic political forces had indeed declined.
In the period between 1970-86, which, 
in terms of the process of the depolitization 
of Islam might be called the ‘period of 
exorcising,’ the regime began to exercise 
51 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 215.
52 A.A. Samson, “Religious Belief and Political 
Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism,” in R. 
W. Liddle (ed), Political Participation in Modern 
Indonesia, Monograph series No. 19, Yale University 
Southeast Asia studies, 116.
53 M.R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under 
Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change 
(London: Routledge, 1993), 120.
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a formal way to the depoliticize Islam by 
activating national laws obligating all political 
parties and mass organization to subscribe to 
the Pancasila as the sole foundation. While 
NU decided to replace its Islamic foundation 
with the Pancasila at its congress  in 1984 
when the  draft  law  was  under discussion in 
the DPR, Muhammadiyah and HMI chose to 
wait until the draft was legislated.
The Consequence of Politicization of Islam 
by Soeharto Regime
Many Muslim leaders were concerned 
that the process of Pancasilaization would 
mean deislamization. For them, Muslim 
acceptance of the Pancasila as a national 
consensus should not be understood as a 
theological statement, but only as a political 
one. They referred to President Soeharto’s 
statement of 1982 that the Pancasila would 
not become a religion and the religion would 
not be ‘Pancasilaified.’ 
There is a group within the Muslim 
community responded to the political process 
in a more reactional way. The emergence 
of this group, which might be labelled 
fundamentalist, was a result of an internal 
dynamic within the Muslim community 
aimed at protecting Islam and Muslims from 
the impact of the ongoing political process. 
The majority of Indonesian Muslims did 
not support this group. Because, the nature 
of Indonesian Islam which, following the 
line of Indonesian culture, is devoted to 
moderation, tolerance and harmony. Beside 
this the situational logic of politics, which 
has created fear and to some extent apathy, 
within the society would scarce encourage 
Muslim cadres to initiate political change by 
attempting to seek justification for Islam.
The Indonesian Muslim intellectual has 
tried to give answers to the social problems 
faced by the Muslim community. The answers 
resulted from two coincidental factors; the 
real condition of the Muslim community 
stemming from its struggle in seeking the 
adequate relationship between Islam and 
Indonesian culture, and the emergence of a 
new educated Muslim generation, including 
HMI alumni. Majority of leaders of the new 
generation are dissatisfied with the ways of 
old generation who had been attempting to 
sidetrack the problems and the condition of 
the Muslim community.
The launching of Asas Tunggal Pancasila 
by the government initially got strong reaction 
from Muslim community of the country. The 
culmination of the reaction was in a riot in 
Tanjung Priok, the Jakarta Harbo; area in 
August 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim 
died at the hands of the Indonesian army 
and several prominent figures were arrested, 
including two members of the petition 50 
group; A.M. Fatwa and (Lt. Gen. Ret.) H.R. 
Darsono. The former was a famous Muslim 
preacher and the latter a famous former 
commander in Chief the west Java based 
Siliwangi Division of the Armed Forces. 
This incident was followed by a series of 
incidents during the year 1984-1985 that 
threatened the stability of the governance, 
such as the explosion at Bank Central Asia 
(BCA) in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist 
Temple in Yogyakarta, and the Marine Base 
in Cilandak, Jakarta. A Muslim group was 
accused of responsibility for the first two 
explosions. For many, these incidents were 
not unconnected, and were reactions to the 
regime’s political engineering programmes, 
which showed the tendency to centralize and 
accumulate power.
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The crisis in HMI over opposition to the 
Pancasila as Asas Tunggal would not only 
result in a split but eventually lead to the 
disintegration of the organization. The vast 
majority of HMI branches throughout the 
country eventually accepted the government 
policy over the Asas Tunggal, because since 
its creation, HMI had accepted Pancasila 
as the basis of Indonesian state. Even 
according to Abdurrahman Wahid, President 
of PBNU for 1980 up to today, HMI was 
an University students organization which 
‘more Pancasilaist’ among Islamic movement 
in Indonesia.54  However, viewed from the 
cultural aspects, Islam got support of the 
government except in political sphere.
In fact, the critical wrestling over Asas 
Tunggal within HMI body was temporary, not 
quite substantial. Because Asas Tunggal was 
accepted by HMI after long deliberation at its 
congress in Padang, North Sumatera. Until 
today, HMI-MPO leaders feel that there is 
no debate on Islam and ideology of Pancasila 
as an important issue. Most of them joined 
the society, worked and communicated with 
those who accepted Asas Tunggal. therefore, 
the ideological issue is not relevant to debate 
while observed that Islam eventually has been 
accommodated within the state. Fachry Ali, ex-
HMI activist of Ciputat branch, said there is no 
difference as while HMI has its basis of Islam 
and those who accept Pancasila. The leaders 
are the same, and the ideas are similar.55
The above issues presented a negative 
image of Islam before the young generation 
during the New Order era, and also forced 
their alienation from the government. Ali 
54 A.R. Wahid, “HMI, Islam dan Pancasila,” in 
Kompas, June 27, 1983
55 H.M. Yusuf (ed.), 50 Tahun HMI Mengabdi 
Republik, 166.
this stage, the umma faced a dilemma. If they 
were close to the government, it was country 
to the   real condition. If they remained away 
from the government, it would benefit the 
anti-Islam groups, particularly Christians. 
M. Amien Rais saw the former indication. 
According to him, Indonesia is a centre of 
Christians activities for ‘Christianization’ of 
the umma through five strategic steps, namely 
education: mass media, economic assistance, 
marriage relationship and political power.56 
The crucial condition, ideally, demanded the 
unity and integration of the umma to counter 
any obstacles either from within or outside 
of the umma. The expected condition did not 
develop, and the fragmentation of the umma 
occurred, including within HMI after the 
launching of Asas Tunggal. 
At the same time, HMI support to the 
government policy brought benefits to 
Indonesian people at large, and the Muslim 
community in particular. If the policy deviated 
from the goal, HMI criticized the government, 
and gave the necessary suggestion for 
seeking the way-out, or urged it to review 
the policy. Although HMI has been close the 
government, this extra-Islamic university 
student Association did not lose sight of 
the fact that many deviations led to deep 
crisis. For instance, it was proved while the 
New Order government was facing a deep 
economic crisis. At that time, HMI through 
its national chairman, Anas Urbaningrum, 
expressed its apprehension due to the ongoing 
economic crisis of the country on the occasion 
of its 51st Anniversary celebration on 22nd 
February 1998 in Depok. Unfortunately, the 
56 M. Amien Rais, “Gerakan Kristian di Asia 
Tenggara: Kasus Indonesia,” kertas kerja dalam 
seminar Isu-Isu Dakwah Kontemporary dan Cabaran 
Abad ke 21, di Marang, Trengganu, September 
1994.
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government did not respond to the criticism 
and suggestion. The economic condition was 
worse due to the attitude of the World Bank 
and the country plunged into deeper crisis. The 
World Bank admitted that a turned a blind eye 
to corruption, social unrest and a collapsing 
financial system during the last years of former 
President Soeharto’s rule. An internal report 
said that the Bank staff and managers were 
aware of the problems but continued to praise 
the country’s economic performance.57  Some 
media persons and public figures like Amien 
Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid has articulated 
the same views as those HMI, but Soeharto 
and his close aides apparantly ruled out the 
constructive critics and suggestions. The 
Indonesian malaise illustrate the high political 
cost excessive authoritarianism imposes upon 
economic development. Soeharto regime 
plainly had overstayed its welcome and built 
up the people’s frustrations with is failure.
The condition was worse as the growth 
of corruption in the country under Soeharto 
regime had become so rampant, that it seems 
almost old fashioned to mention it. But it can 
hardly be avoided in a discussion of national 
level openly and transparently. While for 
long time, corruption was the whip with 
which neo-liberals would beat opponents of 
liberalization, now it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that there is a close correspondence 
between liberalization and the scale of 
corruption. This indeed is now recognized 
as a global problem.58The corruption adds to 
the myopia of private investment decisions, 
57 “What’s Ahead For Asia,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Februari 25, 1999, 59.
58 See “The Symposium on Corruption: 
Constraints,” in Annual World Bank Conference on 
Economic Development 1997, edited by B. Plescovic 
and JE. Stiglitz, The World Bank 1998. See in 
particular the article by Susan-Acherman.
since the commitments and contracts won 
through corruption are even more vulnerable 
to political instability. While the number of 
unemployed is more increasing and dismissal 
of workers in big factories occurred almost 
every day and it was quite vulnerable to the 
social unrest on large scale.
The people’s frustrations reached culmi-
nation as the university students throughout 
the country voiced their suffering via a 
huge demonstration demanding of President 
Soeharto to step down immediately. It was on 
21 May 1998. The downfall of Soeharto paved 
the way to Prof. B.J. Habibie as Vice President 
to become the third Indonesian President. 
Unfortunately, the downfall of Soeharto did 
not mark a complete break with the past. 
President Habibie has performed better than 
feared as he has tried to institute changes (such 
as the election), but he remains a Soeharto 
appointee in his policies. The corruption of 
Soeharto years has been white-washed rather 
than investigated.59 
While politicians and academics in Jakarta 
are preoccupied with political and economic 
reform, the concern in rural areas is much 
more down to earth. In the fast few weeks, 
demonstrations have broken out in at least 
50 districts (called regencies in Indonesia) 
from Sumatera to Nusa Tenggara. Many 
of the protests are related to disputed land 
ownership. All fall into the category of what 
Indonesians call KKN,60  which is fuelling 
public demands for a full investigation of 
Soeharto family’s wealth. One Habibie noted 
“they are like people who have not had oxygen 
for 32 years.”61 
59 The Times of India, May 10, 1999.
60 KKN is the local abbreviation for corruption, 
collusion and nepotism
61 “Politics & Policy,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, June 25, 1998, 21. 
Masykur Hakim, The New Order and Indonesian Islam Politics       43
Many sides regarded the Presidential post 
of Prof. B.J. Habibie as unconstitutional, and 
hence invited the controversial debate. On 
the other side, the vast majority of HMI and 
KAHMI members considered it as legal and 
constitutional. Therefore, they preferred to 
let him complete his tenure as transitional 
president until the new president was selected 
in the month of September 1999 following 
the result of the 7 June 1999 general election. 
Each result, usually, has an advantage and 
disadvantage, including the policies adopted 
by the President Habibie. HMI and KAHMI 
apparently observed that a number of reform 
agenda in one of the advantages of Habibie 
cabinet. The agenda aimed, among other things, 
to promote decentralization and reform, guard 
the country’s interests in era of globalization, 
and improve links between small enterprises 
run by indigenous businessmen and large 
ones, which are usually Chinese-owned.62 
Therefore, HMI and the KAHMI supported 
the reform agenda of President B.J. Habibie, 
and they remained of the view that the socio-
political change was need of the time, and it 
should go on gradually, first evolutionary and 
eventually total.
 
Conslusion
In brief it can be said that the collapse of 
Soeharto regime is the logical consequences 
of his politicization of that non sided to Islam 
in the real meanings, and not for the prosperity 
of Indonesian people.      
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